Sailors with the USS Montpelier (SSN-765) enjoying some company with fellow sea dwellers.
After Typhoon Maysak (2015) went through Vladivostok, a floating dock brock free and crashed into some submarines belongong to the Russian Pacific fleet.
by Military Review / 밀리터리 리뷰
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South Korean Ministry of National Defense recently confirmed the inclusion of “Joint Fire Support Vessel (합동화력함)” in the 2020-2024 Mid-term Defense Acquisition Plan (국방중기계획). The JFSV, modeled after the conceptual “Arsenal Ship,” is considered as the most optimal solution against North Korea’s preemptive strike.
The Republic of Korea Navy plans on commissioning 2~3 of these 5,000 tons ships by late 2020s.
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[[Background]]
As South Korea edged closer to fully establishing its “Kill Chain” network designed to preemptively destroy North Korean ballistic missiles, North Korea unveiled its own series of tactical missiles in response. North Korea’s newly-introduced precision-guided weapons such as the KN-23 SRBM and “400mm Large Caliber MRL” are designed to neutralize South Korean Kill Chain network by preemptively destroying missile bases.
South Korea reportedly operates no more than 10 missile bases, and they are all located within the range of new North Korean missiles in the provinces of Gyeonggi, Gangwon, and Chungcheong. South Korea is thus establishing a sea-based “Second Strike” capability in the case that these missile bases are neutralized.
According to official statement, the 2~3 JFSVs planned for construction will not be based on existing platform, but rather an entirely new hull with displacement of around 4,000 ~ 5,000 tons comparable to the Chungmugong Yi Sunsin-class (KDX-II) destroyers.
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[[Challenges faced by the Army Missile Command]]
Republic of Korea Army Missile Command, in charge of South Korea’s ballistic missiles, currently possesses approximately 220 x ATACMS, 900 x modified Hyunmoo-2, and 800 x Hyunmoo-2A/B. Hyunmoo-2C began deployment in 2018 with a plan for around 300 additional missiles, but that number was increased when the development of Hyunmoo-4 became possible after the easing of MTCR restriction by the US.
Modified Hyunmoo-2 missiles, which were produced in 1990s and modified in early 2000s, are scheduled for gradual retirement, and many of them have been used as targets for South Korean missile defense program like the KM-SAM Block-II. In addition to the Hyunmoo-2 family of missiles, the ROKA Missile Command will possess approximately 1,000 additional cruise and ballistic missiles of different types. At the moment, however, they are facing serious challenges in acquiring operational bases and Transporter Erector Launchers (TEL) necessary to properly accommodate these missiles.
According to publicly-available information, ROKA Missile Command is constructing additional facilities in the country’s central provinces. These missile bases, however, are said to be very costly by nature and cannot remain hidden due to their size and types of equipment associated with such facility, making them vulnerable to North Korean attacks.
Although additional TELs are continuously produced, their numbers are too limited compared to the massive arsenal of missiles.
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[[Limitations of TELs]]
TELs are assembled at various bases during peace time and are dispersed in times of war. Several TELs, a command vehicle, and escort unit maneuver to pre-designated launch positions to begin their operations. Each TELs offer protections against NBC threat and small arms. Despite this, they are still susceptible to preemptive strikes due to the fact that large number of these TELs are usually gathered in one location.
Even though each TEL is equipped with an Auxiliary Power Unit (APU), allowing it to maintain launch-ready status for a significant amount of time, it can only operate for about a week in the field without external support.
In addition, these TELs manufactured by Hanwha Defense cost approximately $1.6 million per vehicle. This relatively expensive non-conventional asset can only launch one missile at a time and requires a rather sizable support unit, thus increasing overall operational cost.
Lastly, as the Hyunmoo-family of missiles get larger, so did the TELs. This led to reduction off-road capability and overall maneuverability. Hyunmoo-2C’s 10 x 10 TEL, for example, require a separate trailer for the missile launcher unlike the Hyunoo-2A/B’s 8 x 8 TEL. In short, these missiles are becoming more and more difficult to operate within the small confines of South Korea.
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[[Cost-effectiveness of Joint Fire Support Vessel]]
The JFSV is said to be very cost-efficient since each ship will not be equipped with any significant sensors or additional armament. The highly-automated nature of the ship will only require a minimal number of crew as well. The overall life cycle cost is projected to be much cheaper than an equivalent number of launchers and support units of the Army Missile Command.
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[[Advantages of the Joint Fire Support Vessel]]
The biggest selling point of the JFSV is that these vessels would operate well out of reach of North Korea and easily solve the shortage of ground-based TEL. According to the Republic of Korea Navy’s current internal conceptual design of the JFSV, each 5,000 tons vessel can carry around 150 cruise and ballistic missiles.
Unlike the ground-based TELs, the JFSV, by its maritime nature, is not limited by missile payload or maneuverability. JFSV would be able to operate over a month at a time if replenished and can virtually remain undetectable to both the public and North Korea.
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[[Vulnerability]]
The main downside of the JFSV is “putting too many eggs in one basket;” loss of one ship would represent a significant blow. Although North Korea currently does not possess a reliable method of attacking the JFSV, ROKN is taking precautions by implementing reduced-RCS stealth features and electric propulsion for noise-reduction to increase JFSV’s survivability.
Although the JFSV is strictly meant to be a deterrent against North Korea, it can theoretically be armed with long-range anti-ship missiles in the future.
Joint Fire Support Vessel, currently in its early planning stage, will enter service in late 2020s.
First close-up look at the Vietnamese VCM-01 anti-ship cruise missile.
Seen here are the missile's launch tubes and rocket casings being manufactured at Factory Z189. The missile's internal radar, sensors, & other electronic components are produced separately by the Viettel Military Industry and Telecoms Group.
The VCM-01 is a continuation of the KCT-15 missile project, itself based upon the Russian Kh-35. Some aspects are differ from the original Russian missile - for starters, Vietnam is negotiating with South Korea for the technology transfer of SSE-750K turbojet engines normally used in the Korean SSM-700K Haeseong missile.
Struck by lightning!
A U.S. Coast Guard Air Station #Clearwater helicopter crew safely assisted a man when his vessel became disabled and grounded near Canaveral National Seashore after being stuck by lightning.
His vessel lost all electronics but he was able to request assistance with a hand held radio.
Day 8: Maritime Navigation.
We spent the morning getting classes on maritime navigation and used up a lot of time setting up the compasses on the CRRCs.
We found points in the bay in the day time and night.
Day 3: Maritime Navigation Remember in school when you'd always say in math class "When the hell am I going to use this in real life?" Well I found out when I would. Never even studied this hard in high school.
Members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police tactical team prepare to board the Canadian Coast Guard cutter Pierre Radisson during an exercise in the harbour of Iqaluit, Nunavut in the Canadian Arctic August 25, 2009. Several members of the team stormed the ship in a mock rescue of a hostage.