In Tale of Two Pegasi, I said:
Socializing capital is much harder. Capital income is not rent. Paying land income does not incentivize the creation of more land, but paying capital income does incentivize the creation of more capital. [...] It’s clear that capital differs from land in an important way. If you tax land income at a rate of 100%, the amount of land in the world will remain the same. If you tax capital income at a rate of 100%, society would soon find itself with much less capital. Land cannot be created, so giving money to its owners does not incentivize the creation of new land. Giving money to owners of capital and labor, however, does incentivize the creation of new capital and labor. So the solution for land does not work as a solution for capital. There must be an incentive to invest money into profitable firms rather than spending it on consumption. The task for the wannabe socialist then, is to find a way to create a more equal distribution of capital ownership while preserving this incentive.”
I mention one of the simplest and oldest solutions to the problem of the distribution of capital ownership: worker co-operatives. After investigating the literature on co-operatives, I don’t think they serve as a sufficient solution. Here’s why:
A co-operative is an enterprise where the workers and the owners are the same people. Each individual contributes their labor-power to the firm, as well as an equal share of the firm’s capital. Capital income is thus distributed evenly across the firm’s members, rather than accruing to distant capitalists. Let’s assume the following co-operative into existence: one with one hundred employees and ten million dollars worth of capital. Each employee provides 50,000 dollars worth of labor a year, and owns a share of the company equal to 100,000 dollars, paying some yearly dividend, which the firm votes on whether to reinvest or to distribute as income.
If the firm is considering hiring a new worker, a dilemma suddenly arises: Where does the new worker’s share come from? If the firm chooses the first horn of the dilemma, it gives the new worker an equal share of the firm’s capital, meaning that now each of the 101 employees has a share worth 99,009.90. Each employee lost a thousand dollars in order to hire this new employee. So the firm is incentivized not to hire new workers, even if it would increase the total revenue of the firm, because it would dilute the capital share of each pre-existing member of the co-operative. This is not a problem of democracy mind you. The issue is that the workers are required to give away something valuable for free. It’s the same issue as taxing capital income at 100%. Capital is not being priced, so it’s not being allocated effectively. Its owner can only ever either give it away for free, or keep it for themselves, so they will always do the latter unless taken by a fit of altruism. Jaroslav Vanek is pretty confident that this “never-employ force” was responsible for the chronic extremely high unemployment rate in Yugoslavia, which had an economy consisting of worker co-operatives. I think he is probably right.
The second horn of the dilemma is if the co-operative tries to price capital, and says, fine, we’re not giving away capital for free. From now on, new members must buy their share of capital. This is how Mondragon, the largest and most successful co-operative in the world, operates. Here is how the system is described in “Making Mondragon”:
Neither members nor outsiders own stock in any Mondragon cooperative. Rather a cooperative is financed by members’ contributions and entry fees at level specified by the governing council [elected management board] and approved by the members. It is as if members are lending money to the firm. Each member thereby has a capital account with the firm in his or her name. Members’ shares of profits are put into their accounts each year, and interest on their capital accounts is paid to the members semi-annually in cash. […] Members share in the remaining profits in proportion to hours worked and pay level. […] From 1966 to the present, all shares in profits have gone into members’ capital accounts. […] Those unfamiliar with accounting terminology might assume that a member’s capital account consists of money deposited for the member in a savings bank or credit union […]. On the contrary, capital accounts involve paper transactions between the members and the firm. Real money is, of course, involved because management is obligated to manage the cooperative with sufficient skill and prudence so that the firm can meet its financial obligations to members if they leave the firm or retire. In practice, however, the financial contributions of members are not segregated from other funds but are used for general business expenses.
A similar system is in place in most other successful co-operatives. In the worker-owned pickle company Real Pickles, each employee has to buy a whopping 6,000 dollar membership share to join the co-operative. The problems with this horn are obvious. It’s no surprise that this system of corporate governance has not seen much success. Most unemployed people looking for work don’t have 6,000 dollars to spend. And the ones that do would be much wiser to invest that money in a different firm, to reduce risk. Worse still, the member-owner cannot sell their share until after they leave the company. They can’t just sell it on a secondary market and use the money gained for consumption like any other stockholder can. The second horn, if scaled up to a whole economy, would be nothing more than just capitalism again, except people are forbidden from buying shares in any company unless they work for said company, in which case buying a share is now mandatory. There is no benefit to this system whatsoever to anybody.
Except for this: management in worker co-operatives is elected by the workers, rather than by shareholders, meaning that the firm is run in the interest of the workers rather than the capitalists. In the spherical cow textbook economic model, this shouldn’t make any difference at all, because in the spherical cow world labor and capital are on entirely equal footing. In the real world however, the capitalists hold an enormous amount of market power that the workers don’t have. It's very easy to switch investments if you don’t like the returns a firm is giving you. It’s much harder to switch jobs when you don’t like how your boss is treating you. Selling labor has much much higher transaction costs. There is clearly an enormous advantage in providing management rights to those who provide labor to the firm rather than those who provide capital, even as a social-democratic reform in a capitalist society. The capital market could look the same as it does now, except all shares of companies would be non-controlling shares. This would accomplish the same things unions accomplish, but more elegantly. The workers would no longer even need to bargain for better conditions and pay. They could make the decision themselves, democratically, if doing so was in their interest. Also, economic profit and schumpeterian rents exist, and in a labor managed firm those rents would go to the workers, which is Good For Utility. This wouldn’t be socialism, but I think it would be an improvement over the current state of things.
"If the firm is considering hiring a new worker, a dilemma suddenly arises: Where does the new worker’s share come from? If the firm chooses the first horn of the dilemma, it gives the new worker an equal share of the firm’s capital, meaning that now each of the 101 employees has a share worth 99,009.90. Each employee lost a thousand dollars in order to hire this new employee. So the firm is incentivized not to hire new workers, even if it would increase the total revenue of the firm, because it would dilute the capital share of each pre-existing member of the co-operative."
This seems equivalent to saying that the co-operative isn't incentivized to hire a new worker if hiring a new worker isn't profitable. If the new worker consumes $100,000 worth of pay, benefits, enabling capital, etc. it only makes sense to hire them if they increase productivity by <$100,000, in which case the incumbent members would lose $1000 but get back <$1000 from the return on the increased productivity being spread equally around the co-op. At face value this seems like the system working the way we'd want it to?
This discussion is talking about "capital" as if it's some kind of easily divisible liquid unit, like money, but a very important thing about capital is precisely that most of it isn't that, and if I stop thinking of capital as like money the idea that workers would benefit from keeping capital idle so they can own more of it starts feeling a lot less credible. Like, if the co-op is a cafe and they all own a 20% share in the blender, yeah, you could say in a sense hiring a new worker makes them less rich cause the blender is now shared among six people instead of five, but nobody actually benefits from owning 20% of an idle blender instead of 16% of a working blender (and thus nobody actually loses anything they're likely to care about by trading a 20% share in an idle blender for a 16% share in a working blender), capital sitting unused is basically just a straight-up loss unless your plan is to sell it or use it for speculation or if you're trading off productivity for leisure, and the last thing would create the opposite incentive (maintaining a high worker to capital ratio). The same would apply to industrial machinery and so on.
These are very basic objections, so I assume I'm missing something?