On Becoming Extinct/Philosophy Essay

Every living species eventually becomes extinct. Extinction of a species can happen from quick climate changes and temperature, change in the sea level of an area, rapid change of habitat, pollution, or a fatal spread of disease. According to an article posted by PBS, 99.9 percent of all species that have ever existed on Earth have already become extinct, and this has happened in waves over time. When considering our own species, extinction is a very real and serious issue.

In this paper I discuss James Lenman’s view in his essay, “On Becoming Extinct”. His argument is that it is better for the human race to become extinct later rather than sooner. He explains we neither want to see anyone die a premature death, nor do we want any following generation to experience the same. I then provide two detailed criticisms of his argument. The first criticism of Lenman’s point relies on David Benatar’s argument on “Why It Is Better Never To Come Into Existence”. In the second criticism I re-evaluate an argument that Lenman negates as convincing for his conclusion, although I believe it is a very important issue to consider regarding whether or not it matters when in time human beings become extinct. I conclude by acknowledging the desires to prolong the extinction of human beings as coming from a non-impersonal level. However, on a moral level we need to re-evaluate some of Lenman’s main arguments for what will better not only the human species, but also the world as a whole.

Lenman asks in his essay, “Given that it is inevitable that our own species will only endure for a finite time, does it matter how soon that end comes?” (Lenman, 137) He also words this later as, “Given that we will become extinct, is it a bad thing if this happens sooner rather than later?” (Lenman, 143) Lenman has two different conclusive arguments for this question, one from a non-impersonal perspective (a generational perspective) and another from a timeless and impersonal perspective. Although he discusses the impersonal perspective, Lenman concludes that we must approach this issue from a non-impersonal perspective because as far as human beings are concerned, it is better for our species to die off later rather than sooner.

Lenman explains that a long life lived to its fullest is something we all tend to want and “not only do we want this but we want many other things that presuppose it: to bring certain projects to completion, to support our children—if we have them—until they grow to independence, and so on” (Lenman, 136). There are standard human desires that we want fulfilled during our lifetime which pertain to a narrative structure, and when a life ends prematurely, we miss out on these things. This ideal narrative Lenman describes as “a beginning, comprising childhood and youth, where we spend much of our energy in learning and developing in ways that will stand us in good stead for what comes afterwards; then there is adult life where we may make some contribution to society…and then there is old age when (if we are fortunate) we may relax in the fruition of all this” (Lenman, 136). It is then obvious why it would not be preferable for an individual’s life to end prematurely, even though it is obvious that not all lives guarantee such a narrative structure as this. Based on this narrative structure that we value deeply, we see that it would be bad for an individual to die sooner rather than later. But what about a species?

Naturally, as Lenman explains, we can see why it might distress us if we were to know that our species were to become extinct in the near future. This extinction could be due to catastrophe or it could just happen gradually due to climate changes, or maybe an evolution of our environment and species that would cause us to become less fertile “over a few generations, to nothing” (Lenman, 137). Even if this extinction were virtually painless, according to Lenman, it would still be a very real harm to anyone concerned because many lives would end prematurely, and, as he explained before, this would not be preferable. At any point of human history, human beings will have narrative structures, such as family and projects, and some requiring time extended further than one human life. Each generation will find narrative structures to why human life as a species is better longer than shorter, with one exception according to Lenman, which would be if one’s life has “become so irreversibly bad that it becomes at least unclear whether it would be a good thing to prolong it further,” (Lenman, 136).

Lenman argues that although we realize the human race will eventually go extinct, we cannot know when or how, and in being aware of this, there are still generation-centered and agent-centered reasons for procreation. The desire to have children is somewhat selfish according to Lenman, but more often than not it is not limited to selfishness because reasons also include the desire to love and care for another. Lenman explains that in wanting to have children people “may aim to enrich their own lives by having something beyond their own happiness to shape and give direction to their concerns, capacities, and energies” (Lenman, 145). This reasoning is not purely selfish as it also has the child’s wellbeing in mind. In deciding to procreate, we must take into consideration the living condition that a child will be born into and fully analyze why it is that we want to procreate. Newer generations could further advance projects put into motion by the prior generations, and this would be a good thing. We would say it was “good for Darwin that his ideas for evolution were vindicated by modern genetics, good for Mallory that Everest was eventually climbed and good for those who died fighting the Nazis that the Nazis were finally defeated” (Lenman, 145). These are all personal reasons for procreation and how it could benefit most human beings.

According to Lenman there are obvious examples of situations in which it would not be morally responsible to procreate, such as to go ahead and have children, or “collectively, to have a whole new generation of children—when we know they will lead miserable lives—might be futile and foolish…it would either defeat the purposes for which we have children or mean those purposes had become so perversely self-indulgent they were not worth furthering and could be furthered only in brutally instrumental ways…of course we know the normal risks attached to human life” (Lenman, 147). In cases where we are more positive than not that having children would cause more harm than good to those children, it is entirely immoral and irresponsible to procreate.

The supporting points to the argument thus far are very personal so Lenman sees it necessary to analyze the situation of extinction in a more objective way, but “the trouble is that if we take a timeless and impersonal perspective, this might seem to be no big deal. For, on such a perspective, future people matter no less than do present people. And this fate is waiting for some generation or other” (Lenman, 137). Things such as the advancement of knowledge and science might be considered as impersonal value—however even scientific motivation (as intrinsic value) lies truly in a more local innate curiosity. As humans we have the desire to know and expand knowledge, and this ultimately is rooted in personal desires even if it contributes to the whole of humanity.

Lenman explains that the cause of our extinction, how awful it is, or whom it happens to, does not matter from an impersonal standpoint because the extinction is inevitable and the details unknown. From this impersonal timeless perspective it cannot matter if we become extinct sooner than later. However, Lenman’s main thesis is that we cannot take such an impersonal standpoint, as we are personal beings, and extinction is something very real that is going to happen, but we do not wish to happen anytime soon. No one wishes for friends, children, and kin to become extinct because of these personal project-based reasons, and every generation has a not-so-selfish preference to see extinction delayed further and further. All preceding generations will find narrative structures to why it is better that the human race goes extinct later.

Benatar holds a very opposing view from Lenman’s, and this is the first criticism. It is better for a human being never to come into existence because although life may consist of some pleasures, it always comes with harms. Benatar presents a very clear argument that the presence of pain is bad, the presence of pleasure is good, “however, such a symmetrical evaluation does not apply to the absence of pain and pleasure, for the absence of pain is good, even if that good is not enjoyed by anyone, whereas the absence of pleasure is not bad unless there is somebody for whom this absence is a deprivation…while there is a duty to avoid bringing suffering people into existence, there is no duty to bring happy people into being” (Benatar, 157). Benatar would not say that it is our responsibility to end the lives of already existing people. He explains further, “Note that when I say that non-existence is ‘better than,’ ‘preferable to’ or ‘has an advantage over’ existence, I am not committed to saying that it is better, preferable, or advantageous for the non-existent. The non-existent are not, and so things cannot literally be better for them or to their advantage. When I say that non-existence is preferable, that judgment is made in terms of the person who would or has otherwise come to exist” (Benatar, 162). Because of this, Benatar would harshly criticize Lenman’s view of prolonging the human species. In doing so we would be guaranteeing suffering (of any scale) to those individuals, some far more significantly than others. Although according to Lenman we have personal reasons (if we are fortunate) to live out a long fulfilling life, there is no doubt that these lives will include suffering, and the absence of suffering is ultimately good, while the absence of pleasure is not bad.

I find a very strong reason to discredit Lenman’s argument within his own essay. Lenman discusses four potential arguments (non-impersonal and impersonal) for a later extinction of our species, but rejects and finds flaws in these arguments. For the purposes of my paper I focus on the second reason he rejects. Lenman explains that “we may attach value to natural biodiversity” as a reason for human extinction to come later rather than sooner (Lenman, 139). If there are living sentient beings at a particular time, it seems it would be better for there to be diversity in the species and when a species becomes extinct, there is less diversity. This reasoning for later extinction is not strong when it comes to human beings because if anything we harm the system of biodiversity more than help it, due to our destructive, wasteful, and polluting ways. As Lenman argues, “the contribution to natural biodiversity of human beings has, in recent times, been overwhelmingly negative” (Lenman, 140). Aside of briefly bringing up the argument that we clearly do not help the natural biodiversity of species through our existence, Lenman does not bring this up again in his essay and I see this negation of the natural biodiversity argument as a very important factor in determining whether it is better for our extinction to happen later rather than sooner. Lenman says himself that “as far as this good is concerned [natural biodiversity] it would plausibly be just wonderful if human beings disappeared as soon as possible” (Lenman, 140). Of course we do not wish pain or suffering against any generation, but if it is true that we have a very destructive effect on our eco-system, if it is true that our contribution to natural biodiversity is extremely negative, then this is reason enough for it to be better that our extinction happen sooner rather than later. Ideally this extinction would happen slowly and painlessly, but at the rate that we are causing harm to the world and the other species within it, and the natural environments that we all depend on, it could save our planet if we became extinct much sooner. Lenman rationalizes, “the value of natural biodiversity implies that, while there is life on earth, it is good that there should be a significant natural diversity of such life” (Lenman, 139). As moral beings it is obvious that at this rate and in this time we are harming our own species, other species, our environments, and exhausting our natural resources. If we continue to have this effect on the planet, we may be the cause of our own extinction, or at least to an extremely miserable and synthetic life while we can survive off of our own synthetic creations. The fact that we have such a negative impact on the biodiversity is reason enough to argue for our extinction being better sooner as opposed to later. Lenman argues that from an impersonal perspective it makes no difference, but because of this criticism not only is Lenman wrong to dismiss impersonal reasons for personal ones; he is also wrong in saying that from an impersonal standpoint it does not matter when our extinction comes. Clearly when we remove our personal desires and anticipated projects, it makes a lot of sense that it would be better for human beings to become extinct sooner than later.

Lenman argues that it is better human beings become extinct later rather than sooner for very personal generational reasons, however we can object to this argument from non-impersonal and impersonal perspectives. Benatar has shown us, on a personal level, why it is better never to come into existence at all. The biodiversity argument from Lenman’s essay proves on an impersonal level why it would be beneficial for human beings to become extinct as soon as possible. In conclusion we can say there are a couple major flaws in Lenman’s argument that ignore personal reasons why it would benefit human beings to become extinct, and also impersonal reasons that would benefit the environment we live in to become extinct earlier.

Bibliography

Agardy, Tundi, Ariel Lugo, Daniel Simberloff, and Peter Ward. "Evolution: Extinction: A Modern Mass Extinction?" PBS. PBS, 2000. Web. 01 Apr. 2013.

Benatar, David. “Why It Is Better Never To Come Into Existence.” In Life, Death and Meaning: Key Philosophical Readings on the Big Questions, 1st ed. Edited by David Benatar. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004.

Lenman, James. “On Becoming Extinct.” In Life, Death and Meaning: Key Philosophical Readings on the Big Questions, 1st ed. Edited by David Benatar. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004.

#death #meaning #life #extinction #humanity #philosophy